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OIL, FIRE, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: THE GULF COAST
CLAIMS FACILITY AND ITS DANGEROUS PRECEDENT
NICHOLAS GUIDI*
INTRODUCTION
On February 2, 2011, United States District Court Judge Carl
Barbier exposed the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (“GCCF”) as a wolf in
sheep’s clothing. Or, more accurately, he disrobed a corporate agent of its
messianic garb. Keep claiming independence from BP, he warned, and you
will do unto oil-soaked Gulf Coasters a far greater harm: injustice sanctioned by the justice system.1
Having determined that the GCCF deceived oil spill victims, Barbier
ordered the GCCF’s administrator, Ken Feinberg, to refrain from representing himself or the GCCF as entities independent from BP.2 Not a year
had passed since that same corporation had allowed its offshore drilling
rig to fail, releasing thousands of barrels of crude oil into the Gulf of
Mexico.3 While Barbier acted swiftly and nobly in protecting victims from
the GCCF’s false impartiality, he left intact the facility’s self-serving
relief protocol. In unmasking the facility, he laid bare its motivations, but
ultimately failed to address its procedural flaws.
Significantly, this focus gave the GCCF tacit consent to employ its
questionable compensation practices, thereby presenting the opportunity
for future claims funds to do the same as long as they cured any superficial defects. Such a cosmetic fix would theoretically permit a claims fund
to shortchange legitimate damage sufferers and pay nominal damages
in a frugal, self-serving manner. As the GCCF’s lifespan demonstrated,
courts already afford mass tort funds substantial leeway in constructing
their compensation methodologies. If the judiciary further loosens its reins,
the growth of such claims funds will act only to the detriment of aggrieved claimants.
*
J.D. Candidate 2015, William & Mary Law School; B.A. 2012, Boston College. I’d like
to thank my friends and family, so thank you friends and family.
1
See In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10497, at
*19 (E.D. La. 2011).
2
Id.
3
Oil Slick Spreads from Sunken Rig, CNN (Apr. 22, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.cnn.com
/2010/US/04/22/oil.rig.explosion/, archived at http://perma.cc/8NH3-PLAE.
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***
After the explosion of BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig, which resulted in eleven immediate deaths and a crude black pool, millions of
gallons deep, BP established a $20 billion trust to address forthcoming
damage claims.4 The nascent GCCF would be headed by Ken Feinberg,
at President Obama’s request, after Feinberg’s successful administration
of the 9/11 Victims’ Compensation Fund.5 Among other means of relief, the
GCCF pledged to remunerate Gulf Coast residents for oil removal and
clean up costs, damage to personal property, lost profits and earning capacity, and subsistence use of natural resources.6
Each of these types of relief falls under the greater umbrella of
environmental damages.7 Consequently, environmental damages are notoriously difficult to quantify.8 They do not lend themselves to market valuations or fixed interval calculations the way real property or economic
damages do.9 For this reason, and for deterrence purposes as well, the
majority of environmental damage awards consist of punitive damages.10
Notwithstanding this computational difficulty, or the imposing magnitude of the environmental damages in this case, the GCCF was improperly designed to assess damage and compensate sufferers. Its status as
a privately run relief fund, its structural framework, its utter lack of transparency, and its insensitivity to the realities of environmental harm frustrated the expectations of those seeking relief. As problematic as the
GCCF’s feigned independence from BP surely was, Judge Barbier failed
to address the compensation flaws which truly hindered the GCCF in effectuating its statutory purpose. And even more damning, the precedent of
a state-sanctioned relief fund run by the wrongdoer presents the tantalizing potential for impunity going forward. If Barbier’s order holds true,
proliferation of such funds becomes increasingly likely as long as administrators fully disclose their relationship to the offender.
4

Jackie Calmes & Helene Cooper, BP to Set Aside $20 Billion To Help Oil Spill Victims,
N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1.
5
Id.
6
GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, PROTOCOL FOR EMERGENCY ADVANCE PAYMENTS (Aug. 23,
2010), available at http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/imported_pdfs/library
/assets/gccf-emergency-advance-payments.pdf.
7
Id.
8
Murray B. Rutherford, Jack L. Knetsch, & Thomas C. Brown, Assessing Environmental
Losses: Judgments of Importance and Damage Schedules, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 51 (1998).
9
Id.
10
Alexandra B. Klass, Punitive Damages and Valuing Harm, 92 MINN. L. REV. 83, 111
(2007).
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This Note will attempt to demonstrate the flaws inherent in the
GCCF’s compensation scheme. It will do so with an eye toward the goals
of compensating environmental damage historically. These are, briefly,
compensation, restoration, and deterrence. Part I will provide contextual
information as to the oil spill itself, the widespread devastation wrought
upon the Gulf Coast, the establishment of the GCCF, and its ultimate
dissolution. Part II will consider the difficulty in assessing environmental
damages generally and the strategies employed in this case. Part III will
delve into the compensation issues that plagued the GCCF and endeavor
to explain their greater implications. This section will take an abstract
view of the GCCF as a privately administered relief fund and consider the
fund in comparison to the judicial alternative. In doing so, it will demonstrate the deterrence flaws inherent in a relief fund administered by the
wrongdoer. Lastly, Part IV will examine Judge Barbier’s order, identify its
problematic reasoning, and discuss the implications for privately run relief
funds going forward.
I.

BACKGROUND

A.

BP’s Negligence Resulted in the Explosion of the Deepwater
Horizon Rig and Subsequent Oil Spill

The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig, located in the Mississippi
Canyon of the Gulf of Mexico, was an especially complex rig, positioned
in an area that required a great deal of care.11 In particular, it “had ongoing challenges with escaping hydrocarbons, typically methane gas,”
rendering its potential for explosive mishaps alarmingly high.12 On April
20, 2010, as workers on the rig began to cap the well, high pressure gas
“shot through the drill column all the way to the drilling platform at the
surface,” where it ignited, exploded, and killed eleven workers.13
There were some indications in the days and hours preceding the
explosion that something was amiss, but BP took questionable steps in
addressing these warning signs.14 Rig workers reported concerns about
natural gas penetration, which prompted BP to select a remedial course.15
11

COLIN READ, BP AND THE MACONDO SPILL: THE COMPLETE STORY 112 (2011); see also Deepwater Horizon Drills World’s Deepest Oil & Gas Well, TRANSOCEAN (2013), http://www
.deepwater.com/fw/main/IDeepwater-Horizon-i-Drills-Worlds-Deepest-Oil-and-Gas-Well
-419C151.html, archived at https://perma.cc/3CD3-KNF9.
12
READ, supra note 11, at 112.
13
Id.
14
Id. at 112–13.
15
Id.
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Rather than pursuing the most prudent course of action, a cement test,
BP elected to perform two pressure tests.16 “[I]f BP had known or better
understood the pattern of problems with Halliburton’s deep-sea cementing specifications, or if there was better communication between BP and
Halliburton in the last days of centralizer and cement design,” BP would
have likely employed the more cautious cement test.17 Instead, the alternative tests appeared successful, giving BP a false sense of security as to the
well’s stability and ultimately resulting in tragedy.18
As the millions of gallons of crude oil19 cascaded into the Gulf of
Mexico, the scope of the affected area grew steadily, eventually encompassing the coastlines of four states and eastern Mexico.20 The legal implications for BP mounted as the oil surged. The company continues to face
allegations of gross negligence in its post-spill oil handling, in addition
to its faulty pre-spill testing.21 In the current proceedings, the government contends that BP fraudulently reported the flow rate of oil into the
Gulf, hindering its efforts to cap the well.22 If found grossly negligent, BP
would receive fines in excess of $18 billion, adding to the $42 billion it
has already spent in cleanup and compensation.23 In any event, the exorbitant sum that BP paid in the spill’s aftermath serves to demonstrate the
astonishing scope of the devastation and perilous consequences of BP’s
negligence. Appropriately, scrutiny of the company came from the media
as well, as it found a voracious international audience for spill-related news

16

Id.
Id. at 112.
18
READ, supra note 11, at 113; see also Donna Brazile, Greed, Negligence Behind BP Oil
Spill, CNN (May 5, 2010 8:20 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2010/OPINION/05/03/brazile
.oil.new.orleans/, archived at http://perma.cc/F3TS-JTPZ (“The failure of the ‘shear ram,’
the set of steel blades intended to slash through a pipe at the top of a well and close off
the flow of crude, should not have surprised BP . . . . Eight years ago, the Minerals
Management Service found that 50 percent of the shear rams tested failed.”).
19
The exact quantity of oil that seeped into the ocean as a result of the spill is currently
at issue in BP’s civil trial. The U.S. government contends that 4.2 million barrels escaped
the well, while BP places the number closer to 2.45 million barrels. Clifford Krauss, In
BP Oil Trial, the Amount of Oil Lost Is at Issue, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2013, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/business/energy-environment/bp-trial-in-2nd
-phase-to-set-amount-of-oil-spilled.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/XFX6-C7S7.
20
Bill Polson, BP Oil Still Ashore One Year After End of Gulf Spill, BLOOMBERG (July 15,
2011 4:50 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-15/bp-oil-still-washing-ashore
-one-year-after-end-of-gulf-spill.html, archived at http://perma.cc/QU65-4PY5.
21
Krauss, supra note 19.
22
Id.
23
Id.
17
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coverage.24 As a result, BP continues to combat a villainous public characterization,25 which further complicates efforts to judiciously address the
spill’s consequences.
B.

The Effects of the Oil Spill Devastated a Large Geographical Area
and Crippled the Wildlife and Economies of Small Communities

Such scrutiny was not without justification, as the wayward oil
devastated the Gulf Coast environment in its gradual, viscous path.26
The oil “soiled sensitive tidal estuaries and beaches,” annihilated entire
communities of wildlife,27 and crippled the enormous fishing industry in
the Gulf.28 The spill’s immediate aftermath left birds and sea turtles
coated in a slick mess, mammals poisoned from ingesting the toxic spew,
and sea corals suspended in calcified tombs miles beneath the well.29 The
prospect of long term effects, meanwhile, threatened to harm human residents of the Gulf Coast for years to come.30 The black pool paralyzed the
food web of fish and other wildlife, decimating the populations of these
species and handcuffing the fishermen whose livelihoods depended upon
their multiplicity.31
Economic damages caused by the spill gripped the coast primarily, while largely sparing the rest of the country.32 The region’s largest
24

READ, supra note 11, at 154 (“Within a couple of weeks of the fire and spill, 58% of the
surveyed American public reported they followed the events very closely. The next most
followed story in early July . . . was followed by only 13% of the population.”).
25
Sean Alfano, BP Oil Spill CEO Tony Hayward Says He Was Made to Be a “Villain” for
“Doing the Right Thing,” DAILY NEWS (July 30, 2010, 8:19 AM), http://www.nydailynews
.com/news/national/bp-oil-spill-ceo-tony-hayward-made-villain-article-1.202186.
26
Environmental Damages Remain Issue after BP Deal, LONG ISLAND NEWSDAY (Mar. 3,
2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.newsday.com/news/nation/environmental-damages-remain
-issue-after-bp-deal-1.3575764, archived at http://perma.cc/U7UR-7XJJ.
27
For photographs displaying the gruesome environmental effects caused by the spill, see
Massive Oil Spill Spreads in Gulf of Mexico, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2012, 10:06 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-oil-spill-html,0,6610369.htmlstory
#axzz2kpHIUqzk, archived at http://perma.cc/F5QC-JXU8.
28
Id.
29
How Does the BP Oil Spill Impact Wildlife and Habitat?, NAT’L WILDLIFE FED’N, http://
www.nwf.org/What-We-Do/Protect-Habitat/Gulf-Restoration/Oil-Spill/Effects-on-Wildlife
.aspx, archived at http://perma.cc/4X29-QQXP.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Oil Spill’s Economic Impact Mostly Local, CBS NEWS (June 28, 2010, 4:58 AM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/oil-spills-economic-impact-mostly-local/, archived at http://perma
.cc/9LHQ-X9MV.
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industries—tourism, fishing, and energy—suffered tremendously.33 Unfortunately for the locals, each of these industries could easily move elsewhere:
tourists changed their plans, seafood restaurants changed their menus,
and the energy industry contented itself in the Gulf’s fairly minimal contribution to the energy market.34 But whereas the Gulf region as a whole
sustained a major economic blow, the small communities that individually
supported these industries experienced a more painful, more complete
economic paralysis.35 Those locals who suffered economic and environmental damages would ultimately turn to the GCCF’s promise of relief
to recover their coastal status quo. Rather than finding a well-engineered
compensation apparatus, however, they fell victim to the facility’s illequipped relief capacity.
C.

The GCCF Was Created Under the Framework Provided
by the Oil Pollution Act, but Largely Installed its Own
Compensation Process

The cause of the harm and the extent of the damage brought BP’s
conduct within the purview of the Oil Pollution Act (“OPA”).36 Passed in the
wake of the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill, the OPA set stricter penalties, increased liability limits, and provided compensation for a much broader
spectrum of environmental harms.37
In the event of an oil spill, the OPA identifies “responsible parties”
in relatively broad terms: “[E]ach responsible party for a vessel or a facility
from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial threat of a
discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines
or the exclusive economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages.”38 The OPA directs such parties to remedy the following environmental damages: harm to natural resources, damage to real or personal
property, subsistence use of natural resources, revenues, profits, or earning
capacity loss due to natural resource damage, and public services for
cleanup efforts.39
33

Id.
Id.
35
Id.
36
Oil Pollution Act § 2702, 33 U.S.C.A. § 2702 (2006).
37
Daniel Kopec & Phillip Peterson, Crude Legislation: Liability and Compensation Under
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23 RUTGERS L.J. 597, 598 (1992).
38
Oil Pollution Act § 2702.
39
Id.
34
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Of particular note, the OPA imposes strict liability upon parties who
meet the “responsible party” designation.40 As such, the justice system
should make no inquiry into the negligence of the wrongdoer when determining whether claims warrant relief. For cleanup and removal costs,
the OPA sets no limit to the amount a responsible party must pay.41 However, the OPA does cap civil liability damages at $75 million, but allows for
removal of the cap if a plaintiff can show gross negligence, willful misconduct, or violation of a safety regulation.42 The OPA thus contemplates a
strict and imposing liability upon those who cause an oil spill in the waters
surrounding the United States, and BP certainly fit this characterization.
Immediately following the Deepwater Horizon spill, the Coast
Guard initiated OPA procedures by designating BP Exploration & Production, Inc., Transocean Holdings, Inc. and other companies involved as
responsible parties.43 In response, BP made initial efforts to comply with
its responsibilities under the OPA and address victims’ claims in-house,
but criticism of its procedures and the sheer immensity of the task persuaded the company to pursue a different course.44 President Obama met
with BP to devise a solution that would both massage public perception
and remove damage assessment from BP’s hands.45 The president convinced the company to allocate a substantial sum to address the innumerable claims and establish an apparatus to administer the funds.46 BP
committed $20 billion at the outset, but the President stressed that this
number did not represent a cap, and that BP would honor each of its
liability obligations to affected parties.47
40

Id.; see Vernon Valentine Palmer, The Great Spill in the Gulf . . . and a Sea of Pure
Economic Loss: Reflection on the Boundaries of Civil Liability, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 105,
126 (2011).
41
Palmer, supra note 40, at 126.
42
Id.
43
Robert Force, Martin Davies & Joshua S. Force, Deepwater Horizon: Removal Costs,
Civil Damages, Crimes, Civil Penalties, and State Remedies in Oil Spill Cases, 85 TUL.
L. REV. 889, 898 (2011).
44
Robbie Brown & Michael Cooper, BP Pays Out Claims, But Satisfaction is Not Included,
N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2010, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/us
/07claims.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/9ESK-8A52; see also Arthur J. Ewenczyk,
For a Fistful of Dollars: Quick Compensation and Procedural Rights in the Aftermath of the
2010 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, 44 J. MAR. L. & COM. 267, 272 (2013) (showing that BP
initially resolved to pay fishing boat captains $5,000 per month and $2,500 to deckhands,
but that such payments were found to be far lower than their pre-spill income).
45
Calmes & Cooper, supra note 4, at A1.
46
Id.
47
Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President
After Meeting with BP Executives (June 16, 2010), available at http://www.whitehouse
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The newly christened Gulf Coast Claims Facility officially replaced
BP’s internal claims processing facility in June 2010.48 As the official means
for spill sufferers to file claims under the OPA, the GCCF became the mandatory first step toward filing such claims.49 This step precluded claimants
from first appealing to the court system;50 those who suffered environmental harm had no recourse but to utilize the GCCF. As a result, any
reservations they may have harbored regarding the GCCF’s claims
processes or its payment record were rendered moot by this requirement.
At President Obama’s request, BP placed Ken Feinberg, a lawyer
who successfully administered the 9/11 Victims’ Compensation Fund (“the
Fund”) and various other mass relief funds, in charge of the GCCF.51 The
president’s handpicked administrator met widespread praise, largely due
to the near universal acclaim for the Fund.52 Celebrated as the paragon
of mass relief funds, the Fund efficiently focused relief on individual sufferers while simultaneously easing the burden on the legal system, all in
the aftermath of a disorienting national catastrophe.53 But while supporters would quickly analogize the two funds, the GCCF represented an
entirely different type of relief apparatus. Unlike the GCCF, the Fund was
a legislative creation, established by Congress in an effort to insulate the
airline industry from certain insolvency and compensate the many victims
of the attack.54 As such, it operated within the guidelines of Congressional specification and bowed to governmental oversight.55 The GCCF, meanwhile, came into existence at the whim of BP, the perpetrator of the harm
the facility sought to address.56 Although the OPA provided for compensation of certain types of harm and vaguely provided for damages, BP and
Ken Feinberg installed their own compensation scheme, and answered
to no supervisory body during the first two years of the GCCF’s existence.57
.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-after-meeting-with-bp-executives, archived at
http://perma.cc/24XQ-FWLC.
48
Ewenczyk, supra note 44, at 272.
49
GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY, GULF COAST CLAIMS FACILITY PROTOCOL FOR INTERIM AND
FINAL CLAIMS (Nov. 22, 2010), available at http://seafoodsustainability.us/uploads/GCCF
_Protocol_for_Interim_and_Final_Claims_2010.pdf; Ewenczyk, supra note 44, at 273.
50
Ewenczyk, supra note 44, at 273.
51
Calmes & Cooper, supra note 4, at A1.
52
Linda S. Mullenix, Prometheus Unbound: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility as a Means
for Resolving Mass Tort Claims—A Fund Too Far, 71 LA. L. REV. 819, 823 (2011).
53
Id. at 828–29.
54
Id. at 828.
55
Id. at 911.
56
Calmes & Cooper, supra note 4, at A1.
57
Mullenix, supra note 52, at 838.
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As the GCCF’s administrator, Feinberg set the standards and processes by which the GCCF would assess and ultimately redress the claims
brought before it.58 And due to its immunity from official oversight, its
methodology did not require publication.59 So while Feinberg made conspicuous trips to the Gulf Coast to observe the damage and billed the time
to his law firm, public record is scant with respect to Feinberg’s role and
degree of control over the process.60 Given his position as a supremely visible figurehead and the GCCF’s general lack of transparency, it suffices
to reason that Feinberg dictated the operations of the GCCF largely on
his own.
D.

The GCCF Was Dissolved Due to Judge Barbier’s Order as Well
as its Dwindling Effectiveness

In February 2011, Judge Barbier ordered Ken Feinberg and the
GCCF to refrain from representing themselves as independent actors.61
Regardless of this ruling, the GCCF continued to solicit claims from
those who suffered oil-related damage and compensate them pursuant
to its assessment scheme.62 In fact, BP increased its monthly payment to
Feinberg’s law firm, Feinberg Rozen, during this period, ostensibly approving of his efforts.63
Nevertheless, widespread claimant dissatisfaction and the federal
government’s growing concern with the GCCF’s compensation practices
caused Attorney General Eric Holder to investigate the facility’s record.64
Holder outsourced the task, commissioning the independent New York
firm BDO Consulting to perform the audit.65 BDO initiated its inquiry in

58

Id. at 819.
Id. at 842.
60
Id. at 842–43, 913.
61
In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, supra note 1.
62
Harry R. Weber, BP Increases Pay For Claims Czar Ken Feinberg’s Law Firm To $1.25
Million Per Month, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 25, 2011, 6:03 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/03/25/bp-ken-feinberg-claims-salary-pay_n_840871.html, archived at http://
perma.cc/EUE7-8DMG.
63
Id.
64
Jessica M. Karmasek, Holder: Oil Spill Compensation Fund to be Audited, LEGAL NEWSLINE (July 21, 2011, 1:26 PM), http://legalnewsline.com/issues/bp-oil-spill/233356-holder
-oil-spill-compensation-fund-to-be-audited, archived at http://perma.cc/853A-RAZH.
65
David Hammer, Feinberg Made Few Mistakes, But 10,000 Gulf Oil Spill Claimants
Shortchanged, Audit Says, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 19, 2012, 6:26 PM), http://www
.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2012/04/feinberg_made_few_mistakes_but_1.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/DUN7-3GLU.
59
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the latter months of 2011 and early 2012, and ultimately announced its
findings on June 5, 2012.66
The “Independent Evaluation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility”
reiterated what thousands of oil-struck residents on the Gulf Coast already
knew, that the GCCF’s assessment procedures often undervalued the extent of their damage.67 Specifically, BDO found that “almost 7,300 claimants were negatively affected by the identified errors,” which amounted to
more than $64 million withheld from GCCF claimants.68 The firm additionally discovered more than 2,600 claimants whose claims the GCCF
“erroneously denied,” because their claim applications did not include
various documents that GCCF protocols required.69
Despite this modest amount of criticism, BDO’s report assumed a
largely apologetic tone with respect to the GCCF’s methods. The report
emphasized that the GCCF faced a herculean and unprecedented task in
addressing the claims of thousands of victims, and that any such undertaking was bound to experience difficulties.70 The firm addressed the seemingly damning concern that multiple claimants in similar positions received
varying awards, yet dismissed this issue rather nonchalantly.71 Reasons
for such disparities included:
(1) [T]he range of options for claimants to document preSpill earnings; (2) the timing of an individual’s claim as
compared to business claims by his employer; (3) the evolution of the GCCF’s methodologies during its tenure; (4) the
periodic implementation of processes to expedite payments;
(5) the automatic eligibility in Phase II of claimants who
may have been paid in error in Phase I; (6) human error by
GCCF claims processors; and (7) the temporary differences
in outcomes that were subsequently corrected.72
In a somewhat problematic fashion, BDO lauded the GCCF’s efforts,
finding that 98 percent of the 574,000 claimants received adequate
66
BDO Consulting, Independent Evaluation of the Gulf Coast Claims Facility: Report of
Findings & Observations to the U.S. Department of Justice (2012), available at http://
www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/66520126611210351178.pdf.
67
Id. at 67.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 70.
70
Id. at 85.
71
Id. at 72.
72
BDO Consulting, supra note 66, at 72.
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compensation.73 Going forward, it endorsed the GCCF’s methodology as a
positive paradigm on which future mass tort relief funds should be
modeled.74
Despite this official stamp of approval, the GCCF’s importance
diminished when, in March 2012, BP reached a settlement deal with Gulf
Coast residents.75 The settlement cost BP nearly $7.8 billion, in addition
to the $8 billion it had already paid through the GCCF and the $14 billion
it spent in cleanup efforts.76 However, the settlement addressed only harm
to individuals and businesses, and thus failed to provide for damages to
natural resources and the environment.77 The GCCF remained in operation, but as a result of the settlement, Feinberg passed administrative
duties over to Patrick Juneau, a court-appointed administrator, ending the
era of the GCCF’s lifespan that this Note will address.78
II.

THE DIFFICULTY IN ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES

A.

Environmental Damages Contemplate Unique Concerns and
Are Immensely Difficult to Quantify

The damage caused by the oil seeping into the Gulf presented harm
assessors with numerous, complex issues. Personal injuries and property
damage cases were routine enough, but the spill corrupted great swaths
of the Gulf Coast in ways that would not manifest themselves for months
or years after the rig failure.79
73

Hammer, supra note 65.
BDO Consulting, supra note 66, at 85.
75
John Schwartz, Accord Reached Settling Lawsuit Over BP Oil Spill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2012, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/03/us/accord-reached-settling
-lawsuit-over-bp-oil-spill.html?_r=1&, archived at http://perma.cc/N8DL-ECNG.
76
Id.
77
Harry R. Weber & Michael Kunzelman, Environmental Damages from BP Oil Spill Still
an Issue After Deal, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-WORLD (Mar. 4, 2012), http://www2.ljworld.com
/news/2012/mar/04/environmental-damages-bp-oil-spill-still-issue-aft/, archived at http://
perma.cc/TKU9-ZWWN.
78
David Hammer, Gulf Oil Spill Claims Process is Now Governed by Negotiated Settlement, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 2, 2012, 10:00 PM), http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil
-spill/index.ssf/2012/06/gulf_oil_spill_claims_process_1.html, archived at http://perma.cc
/RDY9-XLLZ.
79
Mark Schleifstein, National Wildlife Federation Says Environmental Effects of BP Spill
Far From Over, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Apr. 2, 2013, 12:57 PM), http://www.nola.com
/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2013/04/national_wildlife_federation_s_1.html, archived at
http://perma.cc/4UMG-CES8.
74
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Regardless of the BP spill specifics, environmental damages present
unique quantitative difficulties due to their forward-looking nature.80 The
compensation of environmental harm has a number of well-established
purposes, but three are particularly compelling, especially in the context
of this case. The first is remunerating the individuals who have experienced loss.81 This concern represents the most basic function of compensatory damages and finds obvious parallels in other tort scenarios. Second,
environmental damages provide for environmental restoration.82 This facet
finds a familiar niche in environmental compensation, given that environmental value lies not solely in its tangible worth. Rather, such damages
attempt to replicate the environment’s aesthetic appeal, its role in the
wider naturalistic network, and its permanence. Lastly, because the general population and the legislators that represent them collectively cherish
the environment, such damages wield a punitive arm to deter further
harm.83 That environmental damage calculators tend to prioritize punitive
damages, demonstrates the importance of the underlying policy concerns.
These latter two functions demonstrate the forward-looking focus
of environmental damages. However, this emphasis presents the problematic reality that future harm is exponentially harder to quantify than harm
previously rendered. For this reason, environmental damage assessors
struggle to appraise the monetary magnitude of such harms. There are
practical reasons for this as well. Whereas the free market valuates most
products and commodities, there simply does not exist a market for
environmental quantities: “The environmental goods at issue here . . . do
not trade in markets, for various reasons having to do with market failures
(such as externalities and common property problems) and community
rejection of market outcomes (based, for example, on inequitable distribution of environmental goods).”84 So, while traditional compensation strives
to effect an efficient use of resources, environmental damage assessors
must evaluate resources that the market has deemed worthless.85
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When courts do attempt to valuate environmental harm, however,
they have a number of alternatives at their disposal. Most of the time, they
will simply include remediation expenses in the award.86 In the Gulf
Coast, such expenses would include the various cleanup efforts that took
place immediately after the spill. Another means of quantifying harm
might include assessing the environmental asset’s diminution in value as
a result of the pollution.87 An assessor may also attempt to appraise the
value of public natural resources to an entity that represents the public,
such as the local governments in coastal Gulf towns.88
In each of these methods, however, difficulties persist. For one,
depending on the damage, remedial measures will not likely restore the
area to its original state. Moreover, cleanup costs and diminished value
calculations fail to consider the future worth of natural commodities. A
great deal of the environment’s value resides in its permanence, and
permanence eludes valuation, especially when different people experience
varying degrees of enjoyment in the natural aspects of their property. And
a certain segment of environmental real estate does not find its value
solely in its sedentary features. Each plot of land constitutes a natural
habitat enlivened by kinetic, noisy, diverse creatures, each of whose value
cannot be readily quantified.89 Consequently, after the Gulf Coast oil
spill, living creatures bore a devastating share of the burden.90
The difficulty in quantifying such damages results in the third,
punitive prong of environmental damages receiving top priority. In the
case of private landowners, actions for private nuisance—the form that
environmental harm cases usually take—cannot be brought without some
identifiable value diminution in the environmental asset.91 But these measurements are not easily taken and are unlikely to fully represent the
value to the plaintiff.92 This reality, combined with the fact that natural
resource damage suits require a public plaintiff, means that private actions
for environmental damage rarely come forward.93 Punitive damages have
86
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thus become the vehicle by which private plaintiffs recover some measure of relief for an otherwise noncompensable loss, while simultaneously
effectuating the policy concern of deterring future conduct.94
After the BP oil spill, any organization charged with compensating environmental harm sufferers faced an unenviable task. Unprecedented difficulties existed, to be sure, but the success or failure of the GCCF
would be judged, from an environmental perspective, by its effectiveness
in three fields: (1) providing victims with a reasonable monetary substitute
for their loss; (2) restoring the area to its pre-spill state as completely as
possible; and (3) punishing its benefactor and target, so that similar catastrophes would not occur without the utmost care.
B.

The Types of Environmental Damages Available to Claimants
Are Limited by the OPA

Created, as it was, by the OPA, the GCCF was statutorily required to compensate a few specific types of environmental damage. The
OPA mandates first that the responsible party remunerate organizations
and government entities for any costs they incur in cleanup efforts.95 In
terms of actual damages, a responsible party must account for destruction of natural resources.96 However, this remedy is limited to claims by
public entities and so provides no recourse for private citizens.97 The OPA
covers common remedies by mandating damages for property harm and
lost earnings.98 While not explicitly environmental in nature, these provisions do implicate environmental concerns when the land constitutes
the property damaged, or when lost profits derive from natural sources,
as with the Gulf’s fishing industry. Lastly, the OPA allows plaintiffs to
bring claims for subsistence use of natural resources that have been
destroyed.99 These claims are rarer than the others, as they predominantly refer to fish or other wildlife used as a personal food source.100 All
told, the claims available to those harmed by the BP spill were limited
94
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and presented the standard set of difficulties that environmental damage
assessors tend to encounter.
How, exactly, the GCCF was supposed to valuate these damages
was not as statutorily explicit. The OPA provides some hints, however,
in its calculation of damages to natural resources: (A) the cost of restoring, rehabilitating, replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of the damaged
natural resources; (B) the diminution in value of those natural resources
pending restoration; plus (C) the reasonable cost of assessing those
damages.101 Again, whatever help this section of the OPA provided, it
still left the GCCF at the mercy of traditionally insufficient damage valuation measures.
III.

THE GCCF’S FLAWED COMPENSATION SCHEME

A.

As a Relief Fund Divorced from the Purview of the Judicial
System, the GCCF Suffered from Flaws That Characterize
Similar Funds

The GCCF was not the first mass tort relief fund. Since the 1970s,
relief funds have emerged to address such large-scale torts as occupational injuries and illnesses caused by asbestos, among others.102 When
the class of victims affected by some manmade harm is especially widespread, mass tort funds become attractive for the burden they relieve
from the court system.103 In the case of the BP oil spill, the sheer number
of potential claimants would have suffocated the dockets of courts along
the Gulf Coast.104 Mass tort funds are also appealing for the speed with
which they allocate relief, the general consistency of their damage awards,
their structural flexibility, and the finality of their decisions.105
But despite their undeniable benefits, mass tort funds suffer from
compensation-related inefficiencies due to their detachment from the justice
system. For one, their award ceilings generally hang lower than they would
101
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in court.106 This is especially true for the GCCF; whereas punitive damages would normally inflate the compensation awards in the courtroom,
such damages are unlikely to exist when the wrongdoer’s punishment
rests within its own hands.
In the mass tort fund, individual cases receive less individualized
attention. They fall into a general pool, classified by broad similarities,
but the nuances of their individual facts are neutralized by aggregation.
This reality derives from the logistical limitations, as claims funds usually lack the investigative capacity and the discovery procedures that the
legal system provide.107 This process inevitably leads to more meritorious
claims receiving identical compensation to those whose severity is considerably less.
Additionally, whereas the removal from the court system is often
cited as a benefit, it can also work to the claimants’ detriment. Mass tort
funds lack the structure that the court provides, whose methods are legitimized by centuries of precedent and procedural habit. Also, the mass tort
fund may answer to no supervisory body, as in the case of the GCCF.108
Abuses will more easily avoid detection if a mass tort fund polices itself.
And if a claimant walks away from her adjudication dissatisfied, she may
have no recourse to appellate review if the fund’s administrator elects
not to provide such a mechanism.109 These problems affect mass tort
funds generally and, given its independent construction, certainly characterized the GCCF.
B.

The GCCF Instituted its Own, Unique Damage Assessment
Methodology, Which Further Diminished Claimants’ Rewards

While the GCCF largely concealed its methodology during its life
span, the audit performed by BDO Consulting and the GCCF’s claim solicitation documents have revealed its basic compensatory framework.110
The GCCF allocated relief by providing claimants three options for payment: the Quick Payment Final Claim, the Interim Payment Claim, and
106
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the Full Review Final Payment Claim.111 Each of these claims awarded
compensation based upon different types of damage and provided different timelines for the GCCF to review claims and ultimately disburse a
reward.112
First, a claimant could file for an Interim Payment Claim. This type
of claim allowed claimants to “receive compensation for documented past
losses or damages caused by the Spill” immediately.113 In order to file
such a claim, the claimant would have to submit various documentation,
depending on the type of claim they advance.114 For instance, a claimant
bringing a lost profits or lost earning capacity claim would submit an
identification of the alleged injury, documentation of the spill’s profitharming causation, and information as to any offsetting, alternative
employment.115 Similarly, someone alleging loss of subsistence use of
natural resources would present detailed documentation of the natural
resources destroyed, the claimant’s use for them, and any expenditures
made for substitutes.116 Proof of such losses could be difficult to demonstrate, especially without a neutral fact-finder making factual determinations based on extensive evidence. However, the awarding of an Interim
Payment Claim would not preclude claimants from filing the more comprehensive Final Claim.117 Designed to address immediate needs, Interim
Payment Claims would typically involve small amounts.118
Following the awarding of an Interim Payment Claim, the claimant would have another decision to make. She could file a Full Review
Final Payment Claim, which would again cover “documented past and future losses resulting from the Spill.”119 Such a claim would receive a more
intensive review process, thereby assuaging fears that an individual
claim might receive a more cursory review.120 The downside, as the Quick
Payment Final Claim makes apparent, was the lengthy process of giving
claims a full review.121
111
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Alternatively, claimants could opt to file a Quick Payment Final
Claim.122 These claims would involve an expedited review process, which
again called the review’s quality into question.123 However, claimants
who elected to file a Quick Payment Final Claim would receive a one-time
final payment of $5,000 for individuals and $25,000 for businesses.124 The
claimant would not need to provide any further documentation in this
case.125 Given the ease with which claimants could bring this type of claim
and the truncated timeframe, the Quick Payment Final Claim presented
an alluring alternative.
Both the Quick Payment Final Claim and Full Review Final Payment Claim required recipients to sign a release clause that precluded
them from ever recovering additional money from BP.126 Soon after the
GCCF released its Protocol for the awarding of these claims, the Attorneys General of four states along the Gulf Coast published a letter to potential claimants warning them to consider the implications of accepting
either type of final claim.127 The letter recognized the finality of the release
clause and cautioned claimants against making hasty decisions.128 Succumb to the temptation of instant gratification, they warned, and you
could squander thousands of dollars forever.129
As such, the release clause represented the fundamental flaw in
the GCCF’s compensation scheme, especially in the environmental compensation context. The finality of the release clause could, in theory, prohibit claimants from bringing further claims when harms become apparent
long after the spill.130 This prospect held particular relevance in the Gulf
Coast case because the extent of the damage would not become apparent
for months and years after the rig explosion.131 The clause’s capacity for exploitation did not go unnoticed, as environmental groups like the National
Wildlife Federation urged the GCCF to include a “reopener clause” that
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would allow paid claimants to bring further claims if additional damage
appeared.132 Regardless of their obvious merit, these suggestions went
unheeded and the release clause remained a fundamental feature of the
GCCF’s compensation scheme.133
Whatever its actual impact, the cautionary letter identified the information asymmetries inherent in the GCCF’s framework.134 The GCCF’s
secretive nature largely contributed as well. Beholden, as it was, to no
authority but BP, the GCCF did not publicize a compensation grid that
would let potential claimants preview the damages they might receive:
“No valuation standards have been published to the public. There is no publicly available information concerning the identity, experience, or training of staff claims administrators, or the methodology by which staff
adjusters evaluated emergency payments and will determine final settlement offers.”135 This information rendered void the warnings of the Attorneys General, as potential claimants could hardly assess the alternatives
when they had no frame of reference. Taken together, the GCCF’s guarded
secrecy, the calculated allure of the Quick Payment Final Claim, and the
release clause’s stranglehold combined to coerce claimants into receiving
less than they likely deserved.
C.

The GCCF’s Treatment of the Collateral Source Rule and its
Extrastatutory Application of Causation Principles Further
Diminished Claimants’ Awards and Weakened the OPA’s
Deterrent Effect

The collateral source rule finds fairly wide application in tort law.136
It dictates that any relief received from a third party to address the harm
should not be deducted from the claimant’s ultimate award.137 In compensating spill damage, the GCCF opted to ignore this common law stalwart,
leading to further diminution of claimants’ awards.138 In particular, it
“deduct[ed] the amount a claimant receive[d] from private insurance,
unemployment payments benefits, and other government benefits.”139
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Unfortunately, those who bore the brunt of the practice were those working
the hardest to mitigate the spill’s effects.140 BP hired a large number of
fishermen to assist in the cleanup efforts immediately following the spill.141
BP paid these fishermen for their services, as their livelihood had been
destroyed.142 Nevertheless, when they approached the GCCF to recover
damages for their lost fishing enterprises, the GCCF deducted the amount
paid to them for their cleanup efforts from their ultimate awards.143 Due
to public backlash, however, Feinberg revised his position on the collateral
source application and halted the practice of deducting cleanup amounts.144
But this bizarre application of the collateral source doctrine was
not the GCCF’s only deviation from standard legal practice. The GCCF’s
claim assessors employed causation determinations that seemingly
clashed with standards set forth in the OPA. The OPA dictates that “each
responsible party for a vessel or a facility from which oil is discharged . . .
into or upon the navigable waters or adjoining shorelines or the exclusive
economic zone is liable for the removal costs and damages.”145 Nowhere
does the Act specify a requisite mental state for the offender.146 Thus, unlike negligence-based pollution statutes, the OPA’s damage provisions
are enforced on a strict liability basis.147
The stringency of the OPA’s liability provisions serves to emphasize the risk involved in offshore drilling.148 In fact, the OPA is fairly
unique in this regard. As Vernon Palmer indicates, Congress clearly intended to expand the recourses for potential claimants who suffer the
harmful effects of an oil spill.149 Accordingly, the OPA imposes liability in
a much stricter fashion than do statutes regulating other ultrahazardous
activities.150 The variety of expenses and harms remunerated is similarly
expansive.151 Whereas comparable statutes might cover the cost of cleanup,
140
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or impose a negligence-based intent requirement upon personal damage,
the OPA awards funds for “the costs of diverted governmental services,
diminished governmental revenues, and the lost earnings and profits of
private individuals and businesses.”152 The reach of these provisions
assumes an even greater scope considering that the OPA sets no cap on
the number of claimants.153 The punitive magnitude of the Act’s damage
provisions strongly suggests that Congress intended to deter future oil
spills with all of its substantial legislative arsenal.154 This inference is
further supported by the Act’s passage soon after the devastating effects of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill off the coast of Alaska.155
Considering the intentionally expansive reach of the OPA, Congress would dictate that a claims facility pay a wide range of claimants
on a strict liability basis. The inquiry into causation should thus be limited,
commensurate with a strict liability regime. However, the GCCF implemented a proximate cause requirement that resembled a negligence-like
causation scheme.156 Not coincidentally, such a prerequisite stood to benefit BP: “[P]roximate cause is a duty-limitation that benefits defendants
by eliminating their liability in circumstances in which the damages or
injuries are ‘so unusual, extraordinary, or bizarre . . . that the policy of
the law will relieve the defendant of any liability for negligently creating
this dangerous situation.’ ”157 Courts applying a strict liability standard
rarely resort to proximate cause determinations for this reason.158 Nevertheless, the GCCF’s imposition of this requirement more closely aligned
its payout with a negligence regime than the strict liability standard set
forth in the OPA.159
The GCCF’s proximate cause determinations armed its administrator with a great deal of discretion. For example, Feinberg could determine the geographic radius of permissible claims simply by promulgating
152
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new GCCF guidelines.160 Such a measure would preclude potential claims
originating in certain sectors of the Gulf—deemed to be outside the spill’s
harmful reach—from receiving any relief.161 In the case of the Gulf spill,
whose reach corrupted disparate areas of the coast due to aquatic ebb
and flow, this limitation was uniquely harsh.162 Even those areas untouched by oil saw their profits decline when the entire region’s tourism
and seafood industries faced a harmful stigma.163 As some legal scholars
have commented, and as common sense dictates, “[t]hese important decisions should be made in a public forum, enabling the cross-examination
of experts on all sides of the issue.”164 By limiting the geographic reach
of the GCCF’s compensation process, Feinberg likely withheld damages
from deserving victims and in so doing, seemingly operated outside the
boundaries of the OPA.
Proximate cause determinations extended to the types of claims remunerated as well. Although the OPA does not explicitly compel responsible parties to compensate sufferers of psychological damage, a catastrophic
oil spill could plausibly cause such harm.165 Nevertheless, the GCCF declined to address psychological harm, although claimants certainly existed,
because Feinberg could unilaterally determine eligibility requirements.166
The GCCF declined to consult with psychiatrists, counselors, or other
experts who could attest to a claimant’s damaged psychological state.167
This practice merely signified another example of the GCCF diminishing
or even ignoring the claims of those harmed by the oil spill.
Together with its coercive payment schedules, release clause, and
assessment methodologies, the GCCF’s self-serving use of the collateral
source doctrine and negligence-like proximate cause suggest that it operated primarily with BP in mind. As a creature of the law, the GCCF existed
to justly compensate those who suffered from BP’s wrongdoing.168 Yet
each unique feature of the GCCF’s compensation scheme either diminished
the number of claimants or the size of their reward. None of the practices
mentioned effectuated the stated goals of the OPA in punishing careless
160
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purveyors of hazardous materials and compensating their victims.169
That the GCCF constantly sought to limit the amounts it paid to sufferers
indicates its overarching fealty to BP. Its utter lack of punitive force further indicted the facility as an imperfect means of compensating harm.
D.

The GCCF’s Original Power over its Punishment Was Relieved
by Gross Negligence Proceedings, but Future Wrongdoers Could
Benefit from Such Responsibility

The difficulty in quantifying environmental damages likely contributed to the GCCF’s flawed compensation system. As discussed above,
typical environmental damage claims rely heavily on punitive damages
to offset this problem.170 The GCCF, as a mass claims fund, entirely bypassed this requirement by focusing solely on remunerating claimants for
damage actually suffered.171 Nevertheless, BP has not avoided punitive
proceedings completely.172 The company currently stands in civil court,
potentially liable for an additional $18 billion if Judge Barbier finds the
company grossly negligent.173 This determination will hinge largely upon
the quantity of oil released into the Gulf of Mexico.174
Regardless of the judge’s findings, BP will pay a large amount in
punitive damages.175 However, these originate from BP’s specific obligations as a responsible party under the OPA.176 Future claims facilities,
those that could otherwise avoid payment of punitive damages, may not
be so restrained by legislation. The GCCF set a dangerous precedent as
a claims fund created and overseen by the wrongdoer.177 A similar mass
tort fund could similarly put the offender in charge of punishing itself.
In such a case, self-interest would surely keep the defendant from imposing punitive damages on itself in an impartial manner. This arrangement
is particularly problematic in the environmental harm context, where
punitive damages constitute the majority of the reparations.178 Although
169
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a wrongdoer-commissioned claims fund seems counterintuitive and inefficient, it occurred in the Gulf Coast and could plausibly occur again.
IV.

JUDGE BARBIER’S ORDER AND THE FUTURE OF MASS TORT FUNDS

A.

Judge Barbier’s Order Ignored the Compensation Flaws
Inherent in the GCCF’s Scheme in Favor of Eliminating its
Nominal Independence from BP

In early February 2011, Judge Barbier addressed the GCCF’s
efforts in the Gulf Coast.179 He responded to a motion filed by the plaintiffs which asked that he “oversee or supervise communications between
the GCCF and putative class members to ensure that communications
[were] neither misleading nor confusing.”180 The plaintiffs questioned the
relationship between BP and the GCCF.181 They contended that BP and
the GCCF’s claims of independence from each other were misleading and
that BP exerted control over the GCCF.182 BP countered by questioning
the plaintiffs’ right to bring an action in the district court, given the OPA’s
removal of the process from the court system.183 It also denied the plaintiffs’ contention that it controlled the GCCF and maintained Feinberg’s
independence from the company.184
The judge first explained his role as the upholder of the OPA’s
mandates.185 He then posed a number of questions that would guide his
analysis of the question: “Is the GCCF completely independent of BP and
a neutral arbiter of claims? Is the GCCF actually BP or an agent of BP?
Or, is the GCCF another type of hybrid mixture of the traditional plaintiffdefendant adversarial model of dispute resolution and the use of a third
party?”186 Such questions forecasted an uncompromising review, but its
focus was largely procedural. Implicit in these questions were concerns
as to the effectiveness of the GCCF in achieving its ostensible goal, yet
these concerns ultimately went unarticulated. Presented with the opportunity to review the methodology of the GCCF and reconcile its process
with the OPA’s requirements, Judge Barbier declined.
179
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Rather than consider the inner workings of the GCCF’s compensation model, Barbier dwelled on the more abstract implications of the
GCCF’s existence. He first commended mass tort funds for efficiently
resolving blocks of related claims.187 Nevertheless, he determined that BP
created a “hybrid entity” in the GCCF, as opposed to a fully independent
one.188 The judge based his conclusions on the following factors: BP’s appointing of Feinberg as administrator absent plaintiff consultation or court
order, Feinberg’s status as an interested third party, and the monthly fee
Feinberg’s firm received from the company.189 Judge Barbier ultimately
held that such feigned independence misled potential claimants and
ordered the GCCF and BP to refrain from representing themselves as
independent parties.190
Judge Barbier’s order represented an important first step in court
supervision of the GCCF. However, considering the pervasive compensation flaws in the system, Barbier missed an important opportunity to fix
the facility. While BP and the GCCF could no longer refer to their independence from one another, the incidents of their close relationship
would continue to manifest themselves in the damage awards distributed
to claimants.
B.

Judge Barbier’s Order Sets a Dangerous Precedent for
Similar Mass Tort Funds to Shortchange Claimants
Without Claiming Independence

For all the significance of Judge Barbier’s order, and it certainly
held the interest of the claimants in high regard, the order’s failings
placed a fairly low burden on mass tort funds following in the GCCF’s
wake. Barbier’s critique of the GCCF was superficial, considering the
impressive scope of the facility. As long as the GCCF refrained from claiming its independence from BP, it could continue employing its self-serving
compensation scheme with impunity.191 A mass tort fund contemplating
its design could easily address this cosmetic flaw while instituting similar
methodologies that favored the wrongdoer. So long as it represented
itself as an agent of the defendant, the fund could theoretically operate
in whatever manner it chooses.
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The GCCF is still a recent memory, and mass tort funds of a comparable significance have yet to emerge; but when they do, they have a
paradigm to follow in the GCCF. Unfortunately for those who must resort
to these “independent” funds, especially those who have suffered environmental damage, they can hardly expect a fair sum for their troubles.
CONCLUSION
It is hard to fault Feinberg or the individuals in charge of the GCCF
for doing their job. BP hired them in pursuit of its own interests and the
results reflected the company’s motivations. The greater problem lies in
a legal system that will tolerate such abuses. After a catastrophic event
like the BP oil spill, the justice system should prioritize the just reparation of harms suffered, not expediency. When consideration for the wrongdoer rises to the forefront—unless that consideration is deterrence—the
victims’ wounds deepen and the legal system sustains credibility scars.
Our justice system should do more to prevent funds like the GCCF from
proceeding unregulated. Going forward, scrutiny of claims funds’ methodologies should increase, as should oversight of their implementation. Only
then can the mass tort fund realize its immense potential as a beneficial
break for the legal system.

